1 SapherCheck records found for Person Sukhumi, georgia
1. Sergei Vladilenovich Kiriyenko
2. Sanction Caption: CHEM
3. Sanction Caption: Russia / Russie
4. Sanction Caption: CHEM
5. Sanction Caption: Sanction
6. Sanction Caption: (UE) 2020/1480 du...
7. Sanction Caption: The Chemical Weap...
8. Sanction Caption: Chemical Weapons
9. Sanction Caption:
10. Sanction Caption: Sanction
11. Sanction Caption: Russia Sanctions ...
12. Sanction Caption: SDN List
13. Sanction Caption: 726/2022
14. Sanction Caption: Reciprocal
14 Sanctions
1. Sanction Caption: Autonomous (Russia)| Sanction Caption | Autonomous (Russia) |
|---|---|
| Sanction Datasets |
Australian Sanctions Consolidated List |
| Sanction First Seen | 2023-04-20 |
| Sanction Last Change | 2024-06-23 |
| Sanction Last Seen | 2024-10-25 |
| Sanction Properties |
Authority:
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Start Date: 2022-09-30 Country: Australia Entity: Q313915 Program: Autonomous (Russia) Source URL: https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/security/sanctions/Pages/sanctions Summary: Instrument of first designation and declaration Autonomous Sanctions (Designated Persons and Entities and Declared Persons—Russia and Ukraine) Amendment (No. 21) Instrument 2022 |
| Sanction Caption | CHEM |
|---|---|
| Sanction Datasets |
Belgian Financial Sanctions |
| Sanction First Seen | 2023-04-20 |
| Sanction Last Change | 2023-04-20 |
| Sanction Last Seen | 2024-10-25 |
| Sanction Properties |
Authority:
Federal Public Service Finance Authority ID: EU.5895.8 Start Date: 2020-10-15 Listing Date: 2020-10-15 Country: Belgium Entity: Q313915 Program: CHEM Reason: 2020/1480 (OJ L341) Source URL: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2020.341.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2020:341:TOC |
| Sanction Caption | Russia / Russie |
|---|---|
| Sanction Datasets |
Canadian Consolidated Autonomous Sanctions List |
| Sanction First Seen | 2024-08-06 |
| Sanction Last Change | 2024-08-06 |
| Sanction Last Seen | 2024-10-25 |
| Sanction Properties |
Authority:
Global Affairs Canada Authority ID: 3 Country: Canada Entity: Q313915 Program: Russia / Russie Reason: 1, Part 1.1 Source URL: https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/sanctions/consolidated-consolide.aspx?lang=eng |
| Sanction Caption | CHEM |
|---|---|
| Sanction Datasets |
EU Financial Sanctions Files (FSF) |
| Sanction First Seen | 2023-04-20 |
| Sanction Last Change | 2024-08-08 |
| Sanction Last Seen | 2024-10-25 |
| Sanction Properties |
Authority:
Directorate‑General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union Authority ID: EU.5895.8 Start Date: 2020-10-15 Listing Date: 2020-10-15 Country: European Union Entity: Q313915 Program: CHEM Reason: 2020/1480 (OJ L341) Source URL: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2020.341.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2020:341:TOC |
| Sanction Caption | Sanction |
|---|---|
| Sanction Datasets |
EU Consolidated Travel Bans |
| Sanction First Seen | 2024-10-09 |
| Sanction Last Change | 2024-10-09 |
| Sanction Last Seen | 2024-10-25 |
| Sanction Properties |
Authority:
Council of the European Union Country: European Union Entity: Q313915 Reason: Council Decision concerning restrictive measures against the proliferation and use of chemical weapons Source URL: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02018D1544-20240717 |
| Sanction Caption | (UE) 2020/1480 du 14/10/2020 (UE Lutte contre la prolifération des armes chimiques - R (UE) 2018/1542) |
|---|---|
| Sanction Datasets |
French National Asset Freezing System |
| Sanction First Seen | 2023-04-20 |
| Sanction Last Change | 2024-06-23 |
| Sanction Last Seen | 2024-10-25 |
| Sanction Properties |
Authority:
Direction Générale du Trésor Country: France Entity: Q313915 Program: (UE) 2020/1480 du 14/10/2020 (UE Lutte contre la prolifération des armes chimiques - R (UE) 2018/1542) Reason: Sergei Kiriyenko est premier adjoint du chef de l'administration présidentielle de la Fédération de Russie. À ce titre, il est responsable des affaires intérieures, y compris des groupes et activités politiques. Alexeï Navalny a été la cible d'actes systématiques de harcèlement et de répression par des acteurs étatiques et judiciaires de la Fédération de Russie en raison de son rôle de premier plan au sein de l'opposition politique. Les activités d'Alexeï Navalny ont été suivies de près par les autorités de la Fédération de Russie lors de son séjour en Sibérie en août 2020. Le 20 août 2020, il est tombé gravement malade et a été admis dans un hôpital à Omsk (Fédération de Russie). Le 22 août 2020, il a été transporté vers un hôpital de Berlin (Allemagne). Un laboratoire allemand spécialisé a par la suite relevé des éléments, également corroborés par des laboratoires français et suédois, établissant clairement qu'Alexeï Navalny avait été empoisonné au moyen d'un agent neurotoxique du groupe Novitchok. Cet agent toxique n'est accessible qu'à des autorités étatiques de la Fédération de Russie. Dans ces circonstances, il est raisonnable de conclure que l'empoisonnement d'Alexeï Navalny n'a été possible qu'avec le consentement de l'administration présidentielle. Compte tenu du poste à responsabilités qu'il occupe au sein de cette administration, Sergei Kiriyenko est donc responsable d'avoir incité à l'empoisonnement d'Alexeï Navalny au moyen de l'agent neurotoxique Novitchok et d'avoir apporté un soutien aux personnes qui l'ont commis ou qui ont été impliquées dans cet empoisonnement, lequel constitue une utilisation d'armes chimiques au sens de la convention sur les armes chimiques. Source URL: https://gels-avoirs.dgtresor.gouv.fr/ |
| Sanction Caption | The Chemical Weapons (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 |
|---|---|
| Sanction Datasets |
UK FCDO Sanctions List |
| Sanction First Seen | 2024-05-09 |
| Sanction Last Change | 2024-06-23 |
| Sanction Last Seen | 2024-10-25 |
| Sanction Properties |
Authority:
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office UK Authority ID: CHW0012 Start Date: 2021-01-02 Modified At: 2021-12-18 Country: United Kingdom Entity: Q313915 Program: The Chemical Weapons (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 Provisions: Travel Ban Asset freeze Reason: As First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office of the Russian Federation, Sergei Kiriyenko is responsible for domestic affairs. The Presidential Office is a state body within Russia that provides support for the President’s work, monitors the implementation of the President’s decisions, and has responsibility for governmental policy and the regime’s most important actions domestically. Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny was the victim of an attempted assassination during his August 2020 visit to Siberia, in which a chemical weapon—a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group—was used. The activities and movements of Alexei Navalny during his journey to Siberia, from where he intended to return to Moscow on 20th August 2020 were closely monitored by the authorities of the Russian Federation. Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny was a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. Given the role of the state within the attack, and the scale of the operation against Navalny, it is reasonable to conclude that the poisoning of Alexey Navalny was only possible with the consent of the Presidential Executive Office. Source URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-uk-sanctions-list |
| Sanction Caption | Chemical Weapons |
|---|---|
| Sanction Datasets |
UK HMT/OFSI Consolidated List of Targets |
| Sanction First Seen | 2023-04-20 |
| Sanction Last Change | 2024-10-14 |
| Sanction Last Seen | 2024-10-25 |
| Sanction Properties |
Authority:
Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation UK Authority ID: CHW0012 Start Date: 2021-01-02 Modified At: 2021-01-19 Listing Date: 2020-10-15 Country: United Kingdom Entity: Q313915 Program: Chemical Weapons Provisions: Asset freeze Reason: As First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office of the Russian Federation, Sergei Kiriyenko is responsible for domestic affairs. The Presidential Office is a state body within Russia that provides support for the President’s work, monitors the implementation of the President’s decisions, and has responsibility for governmental policy and the regime’s most important actions domestically. Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny was the victim of an attempted assassination during his August 2020 visit to Siberia, in which a chemical weapon—a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group—was used. The activities and movements of Alexei Navalny during his journey to Siberia, from where he intended to return to Moscow on 20th August 2020 were closely monitored by the authorities of the Russian Federation. Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny was a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. Given the role of the state within the attack, and the scale of the operation against Navalny, it is reasonable to conclude that the poisoning of Alexey Navalny was only possible with the consent of the Presidential Executive Office. Source URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/financial-sanctions-consolidated-list-of-targets Status: Asset Freeze Targets |
| Sanction Caption | 資産凍結等の措置の対象となるロシア連邦の団体及び個人（個人） |
|---|---|
| Sanction Datasets |
Japan Economic Sanctions and List of Eligible People |
| Sanction First Seen | 2023-04-20 |
| Sanction Last Change | 2023-04-20 |
| Sanction Last Seen | 2024-10-25 |
| Sanction Properties |
Authority:
Ministry of Finance Authority ID: 26 Start Date: 2022-03-08 Country: Japan Entity: Q313915 Program: 資産凍結等の措置の対象となるロシア連邦の団体及び個人（個人） Source URL: https://www.mof.go.jp/policy/international_policy/gaitame_kawase/gaitame/economic_sanctions/gaiyou.html |
| Sanction Caption | Sanction |
|---|---|
| Sanction Datasets |
Monaco National Fund Freezing List |
| Sanction First Seen | 2024-08-14 |
| Sanction Last Change | 2024-08-27 |
| Sanction Last Seen | 2024-10-25 |
| Sanction Properties |
Authority:
La Principauté de Monaco Country: Monaco Entity: Q313915 Provisions: (UE) 2020/1480 du 14/10/2020 Reason: Sergei Kiriyenko est premier adjoint du chef de l'administration présidentielle de la Fédération de Russie. À ce titre, il est responsable des affaires intérieures, y compris des groupes et activités politiques. Alexeï Navalny a été la cible d'actes systématiques de harcèlement et de répression par des acteurs étatiques et judiciaires de la Fédération de Russie en raison de son rôle de premier plan au sein de l'opposition politique. Les activités d'Alexeï Navalny ont été suivies de près par les autorités de la Fédération de Russie lors de son séjour en Sibérie en août 2020. Le 20 août 2020, il est tombé gravement malade et a été admis dans un hôpital à Omsk (Fédération de Russie). Le 22 août 2020, il a été transporté vers un hôpital de Berlin (Allemagne). Un laboratoire allemand spécialisé a par la suite relevé des éléments, également corroborés par des laboratoires français et suédois, établissant clairement qu'Alexeï Navalny avait été empoisonné au moyen d'un agent neurotoxique du groupe Novitchok. Cet agent toxique n'est accessible qu'à des autorités étatiques de la Fédération de Russie. Dans ces circonstances, il est raisonnable de conclure que l'empoisonnement d'Alexeï Navalny n'a été possible qu'avec le consentement de l'administration présidentielle. Compte tenu du poste à responsabilités qu'il occupe au sein de cette administration, Sergei Kiriyenko est donc responsable d'avoir incité à l'empoisonnement d'Alexeï Navalny au moyen de l'agent neurotoxique Novitchok et d'avoir apporté un soutien aux personnes qui l'ont commis ou qui ont été impliquées dans cet empoisonnement, lequel constitue une utilisation d'armes chimiques au sens de la convention sur les armes chimiques. Source URL: https://geldefonds.gouv.mc/ |
| Sanction Caption | Russia Sanctions Act 2022 |
|---|---|
| Sanction Datasets |
New Zealand Russia Sanctions |
| Sanction First Seen | 2024-03-21 |
| Sanction Last Change | 2024-03-21 |
| Sanction Last Seen | 2024-10-24 |
| Sanction Properties |
Authority:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Start Date: 2022-03-18 Modified At: 2022-05-03 Country: New Zealand Entity: Q313915 Program: Russia Sanctions Act 2022 Provisions: Travel Ban Asset Freeze Aircraft Ban Dealing with Securities Service Prohibition Ship Ban Reason: Linked to Russian leadership, governance, or military bodies responsible for the undermining of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity Source URL: https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/countries-and-regions/europe/ukraine/russian-invasion-of-ukraine/sanctions/ Status: Sanctioned |
| Sanction Caption | SDN List |
|---|---|
| Sanction Datasets |
US OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List |
| Sanction First Seen | 2023-04-20 |
| Sanction Last Change | 2024-07-03 |
| Sanction Last Seen | 2024-10-25 |
| Sanction Properties |
Authority:
Office of Foreign Assets Control Authority ID: 31123 Country: United States Entity: Q313915 Program: SDN List Provisions: RUSSIA-EO14024 UKRAINE-EO13661 Block Reason: Executive Order 14024 (Russia) Executive Order 13661 (Ukraine) Source URL: https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Pages/default.aspx Summary: Secondary sanctions risk: Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR 589.201 and/or 589.209 Secondary sanctions risk: See Section 11 of Executive Order 14024. |
| Sanction Caption | 726/2022 |
|---|---|
| Sanction Datasets |
Ukraine NSDC State Register of Sanctions |
| Sanction First Seen | 2024-03-06 |
| Sanction Last Change | 2024-03-06 |
| Sanction Last Seen | 2024-10-25 |
| Sanction Properties |
Authority:
National Security and Defense Council Start Date: 2022-10-19 End Date: 2027-10-19 Duration: П'ять років Country: Ukraine Entity: Q313915 Program: 726/2022 Provisions: заборона передання технологій, прав на об’єкти права інтелектуальної власності анулювання або зупинення ліцензій та інших дозволів, одержання (наявність) яких є умовою для здійснення певного виду діяльності, зокрема, анулювання чи зупинення дії спеціальних дозволів на користування надрами запобігання виведенню капіталів за межі України позбавлення державних нагород України, інших форм відзначення обмеження торговельних операцій заборона участі у приватизації, оренді державного майна резидентами іноземної держави та особами, які прямо чи опосередковано контролюються резидентами іноземної держави або діють в їх інтересах обмеження, часткове чи повне припинення транзиту ресурсів, польотів та перевезень територією України заборона на набуття у власність земельних ділянок інші санкції, що відповідають принципам їх застосування, встановленим цим Законом припинення видачі дозволів, ліцензій на ввезення в Україну з іноземної держави чи вивезення з України валютних цінностей та обмеження видачі готівки за платіжними картками, емітованими резидентами іноземної держави заборона видачі дозволів, ліцензій Національного банку України на здійснення інвестицій в іноземну державу, розміщення валютних цінностей на рахунках і вкладах на території іноземної держави зупинення виконання економічних та фінансових зобов’язань Source URL: https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/7262022-44481 https://drs.nsdc.gov.ua/ Status: active |
| Sanction Caption | Reciprocal |
|---|---|
| Sanction Datasets |
US SAM Procurement Exclusions |
| Sanction First Seen | 2024-06-14 |
| Sanction Last Change | 2024-06-14 |
| Sanction Last Seen | 2024-10-25 |
| Sanction Properties |
Authority:
TREAS-OFAC Authority ID: S4MRGKLSQ Start Date: 2021-03-02 Listing Date: 2021-03-29 Country: United States Entity: Q313915 Program: Reciprocal Provisions: Prohibition/Restriction Source URL: https://sam.gov/data-services/Exclusions/Public%20V2?privacy=Public Summary: PII data has been masked from view |